Excerpts from Thomas' Commentary on The Sentences of Peter Lombard

The text, in Latin and English, of Peter Lombards Sentences can be found at the following site: http://www.franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/index.html. Thanks to Br. Alexis Bugnolo for his translation.

Note to the reader: as this is a huge work, you may find that translations procede piece by piece, as there is time.Benevolens lector, commentarium istud is valde magnum, et passim verto quaestiones in linguam anglicam.

In I Sententiarum

On the First Book of the Sentences

On the Prologue to the Sentences

Ego sapientia effudi flumina: ego quasi trames aquae immensae defluo: ego quasi fluvius Dorix, et sicut aquaeductus exivi de paradiso. Dixi: rigabo hortum plantationum, et inebriabo partus mei fructum. Eccli. 24, 40. I, wisdom, have poured out rivers. I, like a brook out of a river of a mighty water; I, like a channel of a river, and like an aqueduct, came out of paradise. I said: I will water my garden of plants, and I will water abundantly the fruits of my meadow. Eccl. 24:40
Inter multas sententias quae a diversis de sapientia prodierunt, quid scilicet esset vera sapientia, unam singulariter firmam et veram apostolus protulit dicens Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam, qui etiam nobis a Deo factus est sapientia, 1 ad Corinth., 1, 24 et 30. Non autem hoc ita dictum est, quod solus Filius sit sapientia, cum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sint una sapientia, sicut una essentia; sed quia sapientia quod speciali modo Filio appropriatur, eo quod sapientiae opera cum proprietatius Filii plurimum convenire videntur. Per sapientiam enim Dei manifestantur divinorum abscondita, producuntur creaturarum opera, nec tantum producuntur, sed etiam restaurantur et perficiuntur: illa, dico, perfectione qua unumquodque perfectum dicitur, prout proprium finem attingit. Quod autem manifestatio divinorum pertineat ad Dei sapientiam, patet ex eo quod ipse Deus per suam sapientiam seipsum plene et perfecte cognoscit. Among the many thoughts that have gone forth from various writers about wisdom, what, namely, is true wisdom, the apostle set forth one singularily firm and true thought, saying that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, who was also made by God into wisdom for us, 1 Cor. 1, 24 and 30. But this was not said as if to mean that only the Son is wisdom, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one wisdom, as one essence; but that the Son is wisdom in that wisdom is proper to the Son in a special way, since the works of wisdom seems most to suit the properties of the Son. For it is through the wisdom of God that the hidden things of divine matters are made manifest, that the works of creatures are produces, and not only produced, but even restored and perfected: I say, by that perfection whereby each and every thing is called perfect insofar as it reaches its proper end. That the manifestation of divine matters belongs to God's wisdom is clear from the fact that God himself knows himself fully and perfectly through his own wisdom.
Unde si quid de ipso cognoscimus oportet quod ex eo derivetur, quia omne imperfectum a perfecto trahit originem: unde dicitur Sapient. 9, 17: Sensum tuum quis sciet, nisi tu dederis sapientiam? Haec autem manifestatio specialiter per Filium facta invenitur: ipse enim est verbum Patris, secundum quod dicitur Joan. 1, unde sibi manifestatio dicentis Patris convenit et totius Trinitatis. Unde dicitur Matth. 11, 27: Nemo novit Patrem nisi Filius et cui Filius voluerit revelare: et Joan. 1, 18: Deum nemo vidit unquam, nisi Unigenitus qui est in sinu Patris. Recte ergo dicitur ex persona Filii: Ego sapientia effudi flumina. Flumina ista intelligo fluxus aeternae processionis quae Filius a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque, ineffabili modo procedit. Hence if we know anything about him, it must be derived from him, because everything imperfect draws its origin from the perfect: hence it says in Wisdom, 9, 17: And who shall know your thought, unless you give wisdom? This manifestation is especially found to come about through the Son: for he is the word of the Father, according to what is said in John 1, and so the manifestation of the speaking Father and of the whole Trinity suits him. Hence it is said in Matt. 11, 27: No one knows the Father except the Son and he to whom the Son will wish to reveal: and John 1, 18: No one has ever seen God, except the Only Begotten who is in the bosom of the Father. Therefore the following is rightly said by the person of the Son: I, wisdom, have poured out rivers. These rivers I understand as the flowings of the eternal procession whereby the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both, proceeds in an ineffable manner.
Ista flumina olim occulta et quodammodo confusa erant, tum in similitudinibus creaturarum, tum etiam in aenigmatibus scripturarum, ita ut vix aliqui sapientes Trinitatis mysterium fide tenerent. Venit Filius Dei et inclusa flumina quodammodo effudit, nomen Trinitatis publicando, Matth. ult. 19: Docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Unde Job 28, 2: Profunda fluviorum scrutatus est et abscondita produxit in lucem. Et in hoc tangitur materia primi libri. At one time these rivers were hidden and in some way poured together, both in the likenesses of creatures, and in the enigmas of the Scriptures, so that only a few who were wise held the mystery of the Trinity by faith. The Son of God came and in a certain way poured out the enclosed rivers, making known to the world the name of the Trinity, Matt. 28, 19: Teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Hence we have the words in Job 28, 2: He exained the depths of the rivers and brought hidden things to light. And in this we touch upon the matter of the first book.
Secundum quod pertinet ad Dei sapientiam est creaturarum productio: ipse enim de rebus creatis non tantum speculativam, sed etiam operativam sapientiam habet, sicut artifex de artificiatis; unde in Psalm. 103: Omnia in sapientia fecisti. Et ipsa sapientia loquitur, Proverb. 8, 30: cum eo eram cuncta componens. Hoc etiam specialiter Filio attributum invenitur, inquantum est imago Dei invisibilis, ad cujus formam omnia formata sunt: unde Coloss. 1, 15: qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae, quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa; et Joan. 1, 3: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt. Recte ergo dicitur ex persona Filii: ego quasi trames aquae immensae defluo; in quo notatur et ordo creationis et modus. Ordo, quia sicut trames a fluvio derivatur, ita processus temporalis creaturarum ab aeterno processu personarum: unde in Psalmo 148, 5, dicitur: dixit, et facta sunt. Verbum genuit, in quo erat ut fierent, secundum Augustinum. As it pertains to God's wisdom, it is the production of creatures: for he has not only speculative wisdom concerning created things, but also operative wisdom, as an artisan of the products of his art; hence in Psalm 103: You have made all things in wisdom. And wisdom itself speaks, Proverbs 8, 30: I was with him forming all things. This also is found to be attributed in a special way to the Son, insofar as he is the image of the invisible God, to whose form all things were formed: hence in Coloss. 1, 15: Who is the image of the invisible God, the first born of all creation, because all things were made in him, and John 1, 3: All things were made through him. This therefore is rightly said in the person of the Son: I flow forth like streams of an immense water; in which we may note the order and mode of creation. The order, because as streams are derived from a river, so the temporal procession of creatures is derived from the eternal procession of persons: hence in Psalm 148, 5, it says: He spoke, and they were made. He begot the word, in which he was so they could come to be, according to Augustine.
Semper enim id quod est primum est causa eorum quae sunt post, secundum Philosophum; unde primus processus est causa et ratio omnis sequentis processionis. Modus autem signatur quantum ad duo: scilicet ex parte creantis, qui cum omnia impleat, nulli tamen se commetitur; quod notatur in hoc quod dicitur, immensae. Item ex parte creaturae: quia sicut trames procedit extra alveum fluminis, ita creatura procedit a Deo extra unitatem essentiae, in qua sicut in alveo fluxus personarum continetur. Et in hoc notatur materia secundi libri. For always that which is first is the cause of those things that are after, according to the Philosopher; hence the first procession is the cause and reason for every following procession. The mode is signified in two respects: namely, on the part of the one who creates, who while he makes all things full, cannot be measured together with any; which is noted in that which is said, immense. Again, on the part of the creature: because as a stream procedes outside of the riverbed, so the creature procedes from God outside the unity of essence, in qhich as in a riverbed the flow of the persons is contained. And in this is noted the matter of the second book.
Tertium, quod pertinet ad Dei sapientiam, est operum restauratio. Per idem enim debet res reparari per quod facta est; unde quae per sapientiam condita sunt, decet ut per sapientiam reparentur: unde dicitur Sapient. 9, 19: Per sapientiam sanati sunt qui tibi placuerunt ab initio. Haec autem reparatio specialiter per filium facta est, inquantum ipse homo factus est, qui, reparato hominis statu, quodammodo omnia reparavit quae propter hominem facta sunt; unde Coloss. 1, 20: per eum reconcilians omnia, sive quae in caelis, sive quae in terris sunt. Recte ergo ex ipsius Filii persona dicitur: ego quasi fluvius dorix, et sicut aquaeductus exivi de paradiso. Paradisus iste, gloria Dei Patris est, de qua exivit in vallem nostrae miseriae non quod eam amitteret, sed quia occultavit: unde Joan. 16, 28: exivi a Patre et veni in mundum. Third, which pertains to God's wisdom, is the restoration of works. For a thing should be repaired by the same thing whereby it was made; hence the things that were made by wisdom would best be repaired by wisdom; hence it says in Wisdom 9, 19: For by wisdom they were healed, whosoever pleased you from the beginning. This reparation was done especially by the Son, insofar as he was made man, who, when the state of man was repaired, in a certain way repaired all things that were made for man's sake; hence Coloss. 1, 20: through him reconciling all things, whether they are in the heavens or the earth. Rightly therefore it is said in the person of the Son himself: A like the river Dorix, and like an aquaduct went forth from Paradise. This paradise is the glory of God the Father, from which he went out into the valley of our misery not so that he would lose it, but because it was hiden: hence John 16, 28: I departed from the Father and I came into the world.
Et circa hunc exitum duo notantur, scilicet modus et fructus. Dorix enim fluvius rapidissimus est; unde designat modum quo, quasi impetu quodam amoris nostrae reparationis Christus complevit mysterium; unde Isaiae 59, 19: Cum venerit quasi fluvius violentus, quem spiritus Domini cogit. Fructus autem designatur ex hoc quod dicitur, sicut aquaeductus: sicut enim aquaeductus ex uno fonte producuntur divisim ad fecundandam terram, ita de Christo profluxerunt diversarum gratiarum genera ad plantandam ecclesiam, secundum quod dicitur Ephes. 4, 11: Ipse dedit quosdam apostolos, quosdam autem prophetas, alios vero evangelistas, alios autem pastores et doctores, ad consummationem sanctorum in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi. Two things are noted regarding this departure, namely the mode and the fruit. For the Dorix river is the swiftest; hence it designates the mode, as if by a certain impetus of love for our reparation, Christ completed the mystery; hence it is written in Isaiah 59, 19: For it will come like a violent river, which the spirit of the Lord drives on. Fruit is designated from where it is said like an aquaduct: for just as many aquaducts divided are produced from one source to make fertile the earth, so from Christ flowed forth the kinds of diverse graces to plant the Chruch, as it said in Ephesians 4, 11: He gave some to be apostles, some to be prophets, others evangelists, others shepherds and teachers, for the completeness of the saints in the work of ministry, for building the body of Christ.
Et in hoc tangitur materia tertii libri, in cuius prima parte agitur de mysteriis nostrae reparationis, in secunda de gratiis nobis collatis per Christum. Quartum, quod ad Dei sapientiam pertinet, est perfectio, qua res conservantur in suo fine. Subtracto enim fine, relinquitur vanitas, quam sapientia non patitur secum; unde dicitur Sap. 8, 1, quod sapientia attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter. Suaviter autem unumquodque tunc dispositum est quando in suo fine, quam naturaliter desiderat, collocatum est. Hoc etiam ad Filium specialiter pertinet,qui, cum sit verus et naturalis Dei Filius, nos in gloriam paternae hereditatis induxit; unde Hebr. 2, 10: Decebat eum propter quem et per quem facta sunt omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat. Unde recte dicitur: dixi: rigabo hortum plantationum. And in this we touch upon the matter of the third book, in the first part of which it treats the mysteries of our restoration, and in the second part it treats the graces gathered for us by Christ. Fourth, which belongs to God's wisdom, is perfection, by which things are preserved in their end. For if the end is removed, vanity is left, which wisdom does not suffer to be with it; hence it says in Wisdom 8,1, that wisdom reaches from end to end strongly and arranges all things sweetly. Each things is arranged sweetly when it is placed in its end, the end it naturally desires. This specially pertains to the Son, who, being the true and natural Son of God, led us to the glory of the fatherly heritage; hence we read in Hebrews 2, 10: It is was fitting for him on whose account and through whom all things were made, who had led many sons to glory. Hence it is rightly said: I said, I will water the garden of plantations.
Ad consecutionem enim finis exigitur praeparatio, per quam omne quod non competit fini, tollatur; ita Christus etiam, ut nos in finem aeternae gloriae induceret, sacramentorum medicamenta praeparavit, quibus a nobis peccati vulnus abstergitur. Unde duo notantur in verbis praedictis, scilicet praeparatio, quae est per sacramenta, et inductio in gloriam. Primum per hoc quod dicitur: rigabo hortum plantationum. Hortus enim iste ecclesia est, de qua can. 4, 12: Hortus conclusus soror mea sponsa: in quo sunt plantationes diversae, secundum diversos sanctorum ordines, quos omnes manus omnipotentis plantavit. For preparation is necessary to achieve the end. Through preparation everything that does not fit the end is removed; so Christ also, to lead us to the end of eternal glory, prepared the medicines of the sacraments, by which the wound of sin is removed from us. Hence two things are noted in the words mentioned, namely preparation, which is through the sacraments, and a leading into glory. The first by what was said: I will water the garden of plantations. For this garden is the Church, of which is it said in Canticles 4, 12: My sister, the betrothed, is a closed garden; in which there are different plantations, according to the various orders of the saints, all which the hand of the Omnipotent has planted.
Iste hortus irrigatur a Christo sacramentorum rivis, qui ex eius latere proflexurent: unde in commendationem pulchritudinis ecclesiae dicitur in Num. 24, 5: quam pulchra tabernacula tua, Jacob., et post sequitur, 6: ut horti juxta fluvios irrigui. Et ideo etiam ministrii ecclesiae, qui sacramenta dispensant, rigatores dicuntur, 1 Corinth. 3, 6: ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit. Inductio autem in gloriam notatur in hoc quod sequitur: et inebriabo partus mei fructum. Partus ipsius Christi sunt fideles ecclesiae, quos suo labore quasi mater parturivit: de quo partu Isa. ult., 9: Numquid ego, qui alios parere facio, ipse non pariam? dicit Dominus. This garden is watered by Christ, by the rivers of the sacraments, which flowed from his side: hence in the praise of the Church's beauty it is said in Numbers 24, 5: How beautiful are your tents, Jacob., and after this, in verse 6: like watered garden beside a stream. And so also the ministers of the Church, who dispense the sacraments, are called irrigators, 1 Corinth. 3, 6: I have planted, Apollo watered. The leading into glory is noted in what follows: and I will water the fruit of my giving birth. Christ's giving birth is the faithful of the Church, whom he bore like a mother by his labor: of which birth Isaiah writes in the last Chapter, v. 9: Shall not I give birth, I who make others give birth? says the Lord.
Fructus autem istius partus sunt sancti qui sunt in gloria: de quo fructu Cant. 5, 1: veniat dilectus meus in hortum suum et comedat fructum pomorum suorum. Istos inebriat abundantissima sui fruitione; de qua fruitione et ebrietate psalm. 35, 9: Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae. Et dicitur ebrietas, quia omnem mensuram rationis et desiderii excedit: unde Isa. 64, 4: Oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te quae praeparasti expectantibus te. Et in hoc tangitur materia quarti libri: in cuius prima parte agitur de sacramentis; in secunda de gloria resurrectionis. Et sic patet ex praedictis verbis intentio libri sententiarum. The fruit of this birth are the saints who are in glory: of this fruit we read in Canticles 5, 1: My beloved will come into his garden and will eat the fruit of his apple trees. He will inebriate them with his abundant fruition; of this fruition and drunkenness we read in Psalm 35, 9: They will be inebriated by the abundance of your house. It is called drunkenness because it passes beyond all measure of reason and desire, hence in Isaiah 64, 4: Eye has no seen, O God, without you what you have prepared for those wait for you. And in this we touch upon the matter of the fourth book: the first part of which deals with the sacraments; in the second part deals with the glory of the resurrection. And so from the above words the intention of the books of the sentences is clear.
Huic operi magister prooemium praemittit, in quo tria facit. Primo reddit auditorem benevolum; secundo docilem, ibi, horum igitur Deo odibilem ecclesiam evertere, atque ora oppilare ... volentes, in labore multo ac sudore volumen, Deo praestante, compegimus; tertio attentum, ibi, non ergo debet hic labor cuiquam pigro vel multum docto videri superfluus. Benevolum reddit assignando causas moventes ipsum ad compilationem huius operis, ex quibus ostenditur affectus ipsius in Deum et proximum. The teacher presents a foreword to this work, in which he does three things. First he gains the reader's good will; second, he makes the listener open to learning, where he writes, , wishing, of these things, therefore, to overturn the gathering hateful to God, and to shut their mouths ...we are putting together this volume, with God's help, in much labor and sweat; third, to make the reader attentive, where he writes Therefore this work should not seem to be too much either to anyone lazy or very learned. He gains the listener's good will by showing the reasons that moved him to compile the work, among which he shows his love of God and neighbour.
Sunt autem tres causae moventes. Prima sumitur ex parte sui, scilicet desiderium proficiendi in ecclesia; secunda ex parte Dei, scilicet promissio mercedis et auxilii; tertia ex parte proximi, scilicet instantia precum sociorum. E contra sunt tres causae retrahentes. Prima ex parte sui, defectus ingenii et scientiae; secunda ex parte operis, altitudo materiae et magnitudo laboris; tertia ex parte proximi, invidorum contradictio. Harum autem causarum moventium duae primae insinuant caritatem in Deum, tertia in proximum; unde dividitur in duas. There are three reasons moving him to produce this book. First, on his own part, the desire to be of good service in the Church; second, on the part of God, the promise of reward and help; third, on the part of his neighbour, the insistence of the requests of his associates. On the other hand, there are three reasons that would draw him away from the work. First on his own part, the limitations of his talent and knowledge; second, on the part of the work, the loftiness of the material and the greatness of the work; third, on the part of his neighbour, the contradiction of the envious. The first two of these reasons suggest charity toward God, the third suggests charity toward neighbour; hence the reasons are divided into two.
In primo ponit causas moventes quae ostendunt caritatem in Deum; in secundo causam quae ostendit caritatem in proximum, ibi, non valentes studiosorum votis iure resistere. Causis autem moventibus adiungit etiam retrahentes: unde primo ponit quasi quamdam controversiam causarum moventium et retrahentium; secundo victoriam, ibi, quam vincit zelus domus Dei. In the first, he shows the reasons that move him that demonstrate love for God; in the second, he presents the cause that demonstrates love for neighbour, where he writes, not able lawfully to resist the votes of those who are studious. He adds to the reasons that moved him also the reason that could have drawn him away; hence first he presents a certain controversy about the reasons that move him forward and draw him away; second, he presents the victory, where he writes, which the zeal for the house of God has conquered.
Cupientes. In hoc notatur primo causa movens, scilicet desiderium proficiendi. Aliquid sonat immodicitatem. De penuria ac tenuitate nostra. Hic tangitur prima causa retrahens, scilicet defectus scientiae. Et dicitur penuria proprie defectus exterioris substantiae, unde transfertur ad defectum scientiae acquisitae. Tenuitate, quae proprie est defectus substantiae interioris, unde transfertur ad defectum ingenii. Cum paupercula, de qua Marc. 12 et Lucae 21. Gazophylacium. Gazophylacium repositorium dicitur divitiarum. Gazae enim Persice, divitiae latine dicuntur, et phylasso graece, latine servare; et quandoque sumitur pro arca in qua thesaurus reponitur, sicut 4 Reg. 12, 9: tulit Joiada pontifex gazophylacium unum etc., quandoque pro loco in quo arca reponitur, sicut Joan. 8, 20: haec locutus est Jesus in gazophylacio. Desiring. In this passage, we note first the reason that moves him, namely, the desire to be of good service, or to make progress. It sounds somewhat of a lack of restraint. Of our poverty and leanness. Here he touches upon the first reason that draws him back, namely, the limitations of his knowledge. Properly speaking, poverty is a shortcoming of outer substance, hence it is used metaphorically for a shortcoming of acquired knowledge. Properly speaking, leanness is a shortcoming of inner substance, hence it is used metaphorically for a limitation of talent. With the poor woman, of whom we read in Mark 12 and Luke 21. Treasury. The treasury is the repository of riches. It is called Gazophylacium: Gazae in Persian are called riches (divitiae) in Latin, and phylasso in Greek is to keep (servare) in Latin, and sometimes it is taken to mean the chest in which the treasure is kept, as in 4 Kings 12, 9: Joiada, the high priest, took one treasure etc., and sometimes for the place in which the treasure is places, as we readin in John 8, 20: These things Jesus said in the treasury.
Hic autem significat studium sacrae scripturae, in quo sancti sua opera reposuerunt. Ardua scandere. Hic ponitur secunda causa retrahens ex parte operis, et dicuntur ardua divina quantum est in se. Scanduntur autem quasi triplici gradu. Primus est in dereliquendo sensum; secundus in dereliquendo phantasias corporum; tertius in dereliquendo rationem naturalem. Opus ultra vires. Hic ostenditur altitudo materiae per comparationem ad nos. Contra, Eccli. 3, 22: Altiora te ne quaesieris. Respondeo. Verum est ex confidentia propriarum virium; sed ex confidentia divini auxilii possumus elevata supra nostrum posse speculari. Here, however, he signifies the study of sacred scripture, in which the saints put their works. To climb steep cliffs. Here is presented the second reason drawing him away on the part of the work, and divine matters as they are in themselves are called steep cliffs. Steep cliffs are climbed in three steps. The first consists in leaving behind the senses; the second step consists in leaving behind the imaginary images of bodies; the third step in leaving behind natural reason. A work beyond powers. Here is shown the loftiness of the material in comparison with us. An argument to the contrary, Eccl. 3, 22: Do not seek things higher than you. I answer. This is true with respect to a confidence in one's own powers; but with confidence in divine help we can behold things that are raised above us.
Praesumpsimus. Contra, Eccli. 37, 3: O praesumptio nequissima. Ergo videtur quod peccaverit. Respondeo. Expone praesumpsimus, idest prae aliis sumpsimus. Vel dic, quod esset praesumptio per comparationem ad vires humanas; sed per comparationem ad Dei auxilium, quo omnia possumus, sicut dicitur Philipp. ult. 13: Omnia possum in eo qui me confortat, non est praesumptio. Consummationis fiduciam. Hic ponit secundam causam moventem ex parte Dei. In samaritano, sumitur de parabola quae est Lucae 10, per quam significatur Deus. In Psal. 120, 4: Ecce non dormitabit neque dormiet qui custodit Israel. Samaritanus enim interpretatur custos. Semivivi, hominis per peccatum spoliati gratia et vulnerati in naturalibus. We presumed. To the contrary, Eccl. 37, 3: O wicked presumption. Therefore it seems that he has sinned. I answer. Openly we have presumed, that is, we have taken something before others or in their presence. Or say, that it would be presumption with respect to human powers; but with with respect to God's help, whereby we are able to do all things, as it says in Philipp. last chapter, 13: I am able to do all things in him who comforts me, it is not presumption. Confidence in completion. Here he presents the second reason moving him on the part of God. In the samaritan, is taken from the parable in Luke 10, by which God is signified. In Psalm 120, 4: Behold, he who guards Israel will not slumber or sleep. The word "samaritan" translates as "guard". Half-alive, of a half-alive man, a man who has been robbed by sin and wounded in his natural powers.
Duobus denariis, duobus testamentis, quasi regis imagine insignitis, dum veritatem continent a prima veritate exemplatam. Supereroganti, idest superaddenti, sicut sancti patres suis studiis fecerunt. Contra, Apocalyps. ult. 18: Si quid apposuerit ad haec, apponent Deus super illum plagas. Respondeo. Est apponere duplex: vel aliquid quod est contrarium, vel diversum; et hoc est erroneum vel praesumptuosum; vel quod continetur implicite, exponendo; et hoc est laudabile. Delectat. Hic colligit quatuor causas enumeratas. Quam vincit. Hic ponit victoriam. Zelus. Zelus, secundum Dionysium, est amor intensus, unde non patitur aliquid contrarium amato. Domus Dei, idest Ecclesiae. Two denarii, the two Testaments, which are marked as if with the image of the king, and they hold the truth with is modeled from the first truth. Demanding more, that is, adding more, as the holy fathers did with their studies. On the contrary, Apocalypse, last chapter, 18: If anyone shall add to the these things, God will add plagues to him. I answer. To add can be taken in two senses: to add something that is contrary, or something that is different; and this is either erroneous or presumptuous; or to explain that which is contained implicitly, and this is praiseworthy. Delights. Here he brings together the four enumerated reasons. Which he conquered. Here he presents victory. Zeal. Zeal, or jealousy, according to Dionysius, is an intense love, and so it does not suffer anything that is contrary to the beloved. The house of God, that is, the Church.
Quo inardescentes, scilicet dum non patimur ecclesiam ab infidelibus impugnari. Carnalium, quantum ad illos qui inveniunt sibi errores, ut carnis curam faciant in desideriis, Rom. 13, sicut qui negant providentiam divinam in rebus humanis, et animae perpetuitatem, ut impune possint peccare. Animalium, quantum ad errantes, ex eo quod non elevantur supra sensibilia, sed secundum rationes corporales volunt de divinis iudicare. Davidicae turris. Hoc sumitur Cant. 4, 4: Sicut turris David collum tuum, quae aedificata est cum propugnaculis; mille clypei pendent ex ea, omnis armatura fortium. In which, ardently burning, that is, while we do not suffer the Church to be deceived by those without faith. Of those who are carnal, with respect to those who find errors for themselves, so that they may be concerned with the flesh in their desires, Rom. 13, such as those who deny divine providence in human affairs, and deny the perpetual existence of the soul, so that they may sin without punishment. Of animals, with respect to those who err, because they are not raised above sensible thing, but want to judge of divine things according to physical criteria. Of the tower of David. This is taken from Cant. 4, 4: Your neck is like the tower of David, which is built with turrets; a thousand shields hang from it, all the armor of the strong men.
Per David significatur Christus: turris eius est fides vel ecclesia: clypei sunt rationes et auctoritates sanctorum. Vel potius munitam ostendere; quia ipse non invenit rationes, sed potius ab aliis inventas compilavit: et in hoc tangit unam utilitatem, scilicet exclusionem erroris. Ac theologicarum inquisitionum abdita aperire. Hic tangit aliam quantum ad manifestationem veritatis; et hoc in primis tribus libris. Nec non et sacramentorum ecclesiasticorum pro modulo intelligentiae nostrae notitiam tradere studuimus: et hoc quantum ad quartum. By David, Christ is signified: his tower is faith or the church; the shields are the thoughts and authorities of the saints. Or perhaps rather to show the tower as fortified; because he himself could not find arguments, but rather he gathered together arguments that were discovered by others; and in this he touches upon one useful feature, namely, the exclusion of error. And to open the hidden matters of theological investigations. Here he toughts upon another matter with respect to the manifestation of the truth; and this is in the first three books. Also we have made an effort to pass on knowledge of the Church's sacraments according to our small amount of understanding: and this with respect to the fourth book.
Non valentes studiosorum fratrum votis iure resistere. Hic ponit causam moventem, quae dicit caritatem in proximum, et primo ponit causam moventem; secundo retrahentem, ibi, quamvis non ambigamus omnem humani eloquii sermonem calumniae atque contradictioni aemulorum semper fuisse obnoxium. Linguae, ad praesentes, vel quantum ad communicationem doctrinae; stylo, propter absentes, vel ad perpetuandam memoriam. Bigas, idest linguam et stylum, quibus quasi duabus rotis vehitur a magistro in discipulum, agitat Christi caritas. Hoc sumitur 2 Corinth. 5, 14: Caritas Christi urget nos. (They) not being able lawfully to resist the votes of the more studious brothers. Here he presents the reason that moves him, which he says is charity to neighbour, and first he presents the reason that moves him, and then the reason that draws him back, where he writes. Although we do contend that all speech of human eloquence has always been subject to the calumny and contradiction of the envious. Tongues, for those present, or with respect to the sharing of doctrine; with a pen, on account of those absent, or to perpetuate the memory. A pair of horses, that is, tongue and pen, whereby as if with two wheels he is carried by the teacher to become a disciple, is driven by the charity of Christ. This is taken from 2 Corinth. 5, 14: The charity of Christ drives us on.
Contra, Eccle.9, 1: Nemo scit, utrum amore an odio dignus sit. Ergo, etc.. Respondeo. Caritas dicitur uno modo habitus infusus; et hunc nullus potest scire se habere certitudinaliter, nisi per revelationem; sed potest coniicere per aliqua signa probabilia. Alio modo dicitur caritas amor multum appretians amatum; et sic aliquis potest scire se habere caritatem. Quamvis non ambigamus omnem humani eloquii sermonem calumniae atque contradictioni aemulorum semper fuisse obnoxium. Hic ponit tertiam causam retrahentem, scilicet contradictionem invidorum: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit contradictionis evidentiam per simile in aliis; secundo contradictionis causam ex inordinatione voluntatis, ex qua error, ex qua invidia, ex qua contradictio oritur, ibi, quia dissentientibus voluntatum motibus, dissentiens quoque fit animorum sensus; tertio contradicentium nequitiam, ibi, qui non rationi voluntatem subiiciunt. On the contrary, we read in Eccle. 9, 1: No one knows whether he is worthy of love or hate. Therefore, etc.. I answer. In one way, charity is called an infused habit; and no one can know if he possesses this infused habit with certainty, except by a revelation; but someone may guess by certain likely signs. In another way, charity is called a love that places a high value on the beloved; and so someone may know that he has charity. Although we do not doubt that every speech of human eloquence was always subject to the calumny and contradiction of the envious. Here he presents the third reason that draws him back, namely the contradiction of the envious, and he does three things. First, he presents the evidence of contradiction by a simile in other things; second, he presents the cause of contradiction for a disorder of the will, from which error, envy, and contradiction arise, where he writes, because with the motions of the will that dissent, the sense of their minds also becomes dissenting; third, he presents the wickedness of those who contradict, where he writes, they who do not submit their will to reason.
Calumniae, quae est occulta et particularis impugnatio; contradictioni, quae est aperta, et in toto, et universalis; obnoxium, quasi poenae vel noxae addictum. Veri ratione perfectum; idest, perficiebat secundum rationem veritatis, videlicet quantum ad illos qui male intelligunt, et tamen malum intellectum pertinaci voluntate defendunt. Complacet, quantum ad illos quorum voluntas inordinate post se trahit iudicium rationis, ut verum iudicetur illud quod placet. Offendenti, idest quod displicet. Calumny, which is a hidden and particular attack; contradiction, which is open, and total, and universal; obnoxious (liable to, subject to), as if given up to punishment or injury. Perfect in true reason; that is, he perfected according to the reason of truth, specifically with respect to those who understand badly, and yet defend their bad understanding with an obstinate will. Pleases, with respect to those whose will inordinately pulls after itself the judgment of the reason, to judge the truth as it pleases them. Offending, that is, that which displeases.
Contra, 3 Esdrae, 4, 39: Omnes benignantur in operibus eius. Ergo etc.. Veritas secundum se semper amatur; sed per accidens potest haberi odio, et hoc accidens est infinitum: quia causae per accidens, secundum philosophum infinitae sunt. Deus huius saeculi. Sumitur 2 Corinth., 4, et exponitur de Deo vero, qui operatur invidiam, permittendo; vel de diabolo, cui saeculum obedit, qui operatur suggerendo. Diffidentiae, vel quia diffidunt de Deo, vel quia de eis diffidendum est ex ratione morbi, quamvis non ex potestate medici. Qui non rationi voluntatem subiiciunt. Hic ostendit contradicentium nequitiam; et primo ex inordinata professione; secundo ex simulata religione, ibi, habent rationem sapientiae in superstitione; tertio ex pertinaci contentione, ibi, qui contentioni studentes, contra veritatem sine foedere bellant. On the contrary, 3 Esdras, 4, 39: All benefit in his works. Therefore etc.. The truth is loved on its own terms; but for accidental reasons the truth may be regarded with hate, and this accidental reason is without limnit; because causes that are by accident, according to the philosopher, are infinite. The God of this age. This phrase is taken from 2 Corinth., 4, and it is explained to refer to the true God, who works envy by permitting it; or it may be explained as referring to the devil, whom this age obeys, who works by suggesting. Distrust, either because they distrust God, or because there is some uncertainty about them because of illness, although not because of the power of the physician. Those who do not sumit their will to reason. Here he shows the wickedness of those who contradict; and first from disordered profession; second, from a pretense of religion, where he writes, They have the appearance of wisdom in superstition; third, from obstinate argument, where he writes, those who make a study of argument make war against the truth without honour.
Ostendit autem primo ex duobus eos esse inordinatos, scilicet quia voluntas non sequitur rationem, sed e converso; quod tangit ubi dicit: qui non rationi voluntatem subiiciunt: et quia rationem suam non subiiciunt sacrae doctrinae; quod notatur ibi, nec doctrinae studium impendunt. Somniarunt, quasi phantasiando, sicut homo in somniis. Sed ad fabulas convertentes auditum. Sumitur de 2 Timoth. 4. Fabula enim composita est ex miris, secundum philosophum, et isti semper volunt nova audire. Professio, idest studium. Docenda, idest digna doceri. Rationem, idest argumentum ad ostendendum sapientiam. In superstitione, superflua religione exterius simlulata. Quia fidei defectionem sequitur hypocrisis mendax. First he shows that they are disordered for two reasons, namely, that their will does not follow reason, but the other way around; which he touches upon where he says: they who do not submit their will to reason: and because they do not submit their reason to sacred doctrine; which is noted where he writes: nor do they devote study to doctrine. They dream, as if by indulging in imagination, like a man in his dreams. But turning their hearing to fables. This is taken from 2 Timoth. 4. A fable is composed of marvels, according to the philosopher, and these men always want to hear new things. Professio, that is study or interest. Things to be taught, that is, things worth teaching. Reason, that is, an argument for demonstrating wisdom. In superstitione, excessive religious practice outwardly simulated. Because the lying hypocrisy follows the falling away from faith.
Sumitur 1 Timoth. 4, 1: Discedent quidam a fide, attendentes spiritibus erroris, et doctrinis daemoniorum in hypocrisi loquentium mendacium. Omnium verborum. Contra, Beda: Nulla falsa est doctrina, quae non aliqua vera intermisceat. Respondeo, illa vera quae dicunt, quamvis in se vera sint, tamen quantum ad usum eorum falsa sunt, quia falso utuntur eis. It is citing 1 Timoth. 4, 1: Some will turn away from the faith and will heed spirits of error, and the doctrines of demons in the hypocrisy of those who speak a lie. Of all words. On the contrary, Bede says: There is no false doctrine that does not intermix certain true things. I answer, that the true things they say, although these things are true in themselves, yet they are false with respect to their use, because they use them falsely.
Pruriginem, idest inordinatum desiderium nova audiendi, sicut pruritus concitatur ex calore inordinato. Sumitur ex 2 Tim. 4, 3: Erit tempus, cum... ad sua desideria coacervabunt sibi magistros, prurientes auribus. Dogmate, propter hoc quod ratio voluntatem sequitur. Contentioni, quae, secundum Ambrosium ad Rom. est impugnatio veritatis cum confidentia clamoris. Veritas. 3 Esdr. 4, 38: Veritas manet, et invalescit in aeternum.. Itching desire, that is, an inordinate desire to hear new things, just as an itch is aroused by inordinate heat. This is citing 2 Tim. 4, 3: There will be a time when ... people with itching ears according to their own desire will gather to themselves teachers. Dogma, for the reason that the reason is following the will. Truth. 3 Esdr. 4, 38: Truth remains, and grows strong forever.
Horum igitur Deo odibilem ecclesiam evertere atque ora oppilare... volentes, in labore multo ac sudore hoc volumen, Deo praestante, compegimus. Hic reddit auditorum docilem, praelibando causas operis: et primo ponit causam finalem quantum ad duas utilitates, scilicet destructionem erroris; unde dicit: odibilem ecclesiam: Psalm. 25, 5: Odivi ecclesiam malignantium: ne virus, idest ne venenum, in alios effundere queant: et manifestationem veritatis: unde dicit: lucernam veritatis in candelabro exaltare volentes. As we desire to overthrow the church that is hateful to God and shut their mouths, we are putting together this volume, with God's help, in much labor and sweat. Here he renders the listener open to learning, pouring forth the reasons for the work: and first he sets forth the final cause with respect to two useful features, namely, the destruction of error; hence he says: the church that is hateful: Psalm. 25, 5: I have hated the church of the evil-doers: so that they won't be able to pour out their virus, that is, venum, to others: and the second use is the manifestation of truth: hence he says: Wishing to raise the lantern of truth in the candelabra.
Sumitur de Luc. 8, 15: Nemo accendit lucernam, et ponit eam sub modio. In candelabro, idest in aperto. Secundo tangit causam eficientem, scilicet principalem, Deo praestante: instrumentalem, compegimus: quia hoc opus est quasi compaginatum ex diversis auctoritatibus. Sudore, quocumque defectu corporali, qui sequitur laborem spiritualem. Tertio, ostendit causam materialem ibi: ex testimoniis veritatis, Psalm. 118, 152: Initio cognovi de testimoniis tuis. Quarto causam formalem quantum ad distinctionem librorum: in quatuor libros: et quantum ad modum operis: in quo maiorum exempla, quantum ad similitudines: doctrinam, quantum ad rationes, reperies. Vipereae, haereticae: haeretici enim pariendo alios in sua haeresi, pereunt sicut vipera. This is citing from Luke 8, 15: No one lights a lamp and puts it under a bushel. In the candelabra, that is, in the open. Second, he touches upon the efficient cause, that is, the principal cause, with God helping: and the instrumental cause, we are putting together: because this work is put together, as it were, from various authors. Sweat, by whatever physical shortcoming, which follows spiritual labor. Third, he shows the material cause where he writes: ex testimoniis veritatis, Psalm. 118, 152: From the beginning I have known of your testimonies.. Fourth, he presents the formal cause for the distinction of the books: in quatuor libros: and with respect to the mode of the work: in which you will find examples of greater things, with respect to likenesses: doctrine, with respect to reasoned arguments. Vipers, heretics: for heretics in giving birth to others in their heresy perish like vipers. (translator: perhaps a typographical error in the Latin- it probably should be "give birth like vipers" - "peperunt" instead of "pereunt").
Prodidimus, reseravimus. Adiicit viam. Complexi, amplexantes. Impiae, infidelis. Inter utrumque, scilicet, nec nimis alte, nec nimis humiliter: vel inter duos contrarios errores, sicut Sabellii, et Arii. Non a paternis discessit limitibus, secundum illud Proverb. 22, 28: Non transferes terminos antiquos, quos posuerunt patres tui. Non igitur debet hic labor cuiquam pigro, vel multum docto, videri superfluus. Hic reddit auditorum attentum: et primo ex utilitate operis, ibi:brevi volumine complicans patrum sententias. Sententia, secundum Avicennam, est definitiva et certissima conceptio. Secundo ex profunditate materiae, ibi: in hoc autem tractatu pium lectorem, qui secundum fidem intelligat, liberum correctorem, qui solum propter correctionem corrigat, desidero. We put forth, we made known. He adds the way. Embraced, embraced with the mind. Impious, unfaithful. Between both, namely, neither too high, nor too humbly: or between two contrary errors, such as that of Sabellius and that of Arius. It has not partes from the limits of the fathers, according to Prov. 22, 28: Do not move the ancient limits that your fathers set. There this should not seem excessive either to anyone who is lazy, who anyone who is much learned. Here he makes the reader attentive: and first from the utility of the work, where he writes: in a brief volume bringing together the sayings of the fathers. A saying, according to Avicenna, is a definitive and most certain conception. Second, from the depth of the material, where he writes: I desire in this treatis the pious reader who understands according to faith, the free corrector, who corrects only for the sake of correction.
Liber enim, secundum philosophum, dicitur qui causa sui est, et non propter odium vel invidiam. Tertio ex ordinatione modi procedendi, ibi: ut autem quod quaeritur facilius occurrat, titulos quibus singulorum librorum capitula distinguuntur, praemisimus. Ad evidentiam huius sacrae doctrinae, quae in hoc libro traditur, quaeruntur quinque: 1 de necessitate ipius, 2 supposito quod sit necessaria, and sit una, val plures; 3 si sit una, an practica, vel speculativa: et si speculativa, vel scientia, vel intellectus; 4 de subiecto ipsius; 5 de modo. For we call a free man, according to the philosopher, he who is his own cause, who does not act because of hate or jealousy. Third, from the ordering of the way of proceding, where he writes: so that that which is sought may be found more easily, we set forth the titles whereby the headings of the particular books are distinguished. As evidence of the sacred doctrine passed on in this book five things are sought: 1. on its necessity, 2 granted that it is necessary, whether it is one or many; 3 if it is one, whether it is practical or speculative: and if it is speculative, whether it is science or understanding; 4. on its subject; 5 on the mode.

In I Sententiarum - Question 1, Article 1.

Utrum praeter physicas disciplinas alia doctrina sit homini necessaria Whether besides the physical disciplines some other doctrine is necessary to man
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter physicas disciplinas nulla sit homini doctrina necessaria. Sicut enim dicit Dionysius in Epistola ad Polycarpum, philosophia est cognitio existentium; et constat, inducendo in singulis, quod de quolibet genere existentium in philosophia determinatur; quia de creatore et creaturis, tam de his quae sunt ab opere naturae, quam de his quae sunt ab opere nostro. Sed nulla doctrina potest esse nisi de existentibus, quia non entis non est scientia. Ergo praeter physicas disciplinas nulla doctrina debet esse. To the first question we procede. It seems that beside the physical disciplines no other doctrine is necessary to man. For as Dionysius says in his Epistle to Polycarp, philosophy is a knowledge of things that exist; and it is plain that when we apply this to particular things, that in philosophy we make determinate statements about every kind of existing thing; since it concerns both creator and creatures, both this that are by the work of nature, and those that are by our work. But no doctrine can be unless it is about things that exist, because there is no knowledge of that which is not. Therefore there should be no doctrine apart from the physical disciplines.
Item, omnis doctrina est ad perfectionem: vel quantum ad intellectum, sicut speculativae, vel quantum ad affectum procedentem in opus, sicut practicae. Sed utrumquae completur per philosophiam; quia per domonstrativas scientias perficitur intellectus, per morales affectus. Ergo non est necessaria alia doctrina. Again, every doctrine is for the purpose of perfection; either for the intellect, such as the speculative doctrines, or for the human character that procedes to a work, such as the practical doctrines. But both of these are completed by philosophy; because the intellect is perfected by the demonstrative sciences, and the character is completed by the moral sciences. Therefore no other doctrine is necessary.
Praeterea, quaecumquae naturali intellectu possunt cognosci ex principiis rationis, vel sunt in philosophia tradita, vel per principia philosophiae inveniri possunt. Sed ad perfectionem hominis sufficit illa cognitio quae ex naturali intellectu potest haberi. Ergo praeter philosophiam non est necessaria alia doctrina. Probatio mediae. Illud quod per se suam perfectionem consequi potest, nobilius est eo quod per se consequi non potest. Sed alia animalia et creaturae insensibiles ex puris naturalibus consequuntur finem suum; quamvis non sine Deo, qui omnia in omnibus operatur. Ergo et homo, cum sit nobilior eis, per naturalem intellectum cognitionem sufficientem suae perfectioni habere potest. Furthermore, all things whatsoever can be known by our natural intellect by the principles of reason, whether these have been passed on in philosophy, or whether they can be found by the principles of philosophy. But that knoledge that can be gained by our natural intellect is enough for man's perfection. Therefore apart from philosophy no other doctrine is necessary. Proof of the middle term. That which can achieve its own perfection by itself is nobler than that which it cannot achieve by itself. But other animals and insensible creatures achieve their end by purely natural means; although not without God, who works all things in all things. Therefore man also, as he is nobler than they, can have knowledge sufficient for his own perfection by his natural understanding.
Contra, Hebr. 11, 6: Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. Placere autem Deo est summe necessarium. Cum igitur ad ea quae sunt fidei, philosophia non possit ascendere, oportet esse aliquam doctrinam quae ex fidei principiis procedat. On the Contary, Heb. 11, 6: Without faith it is impossible to please God. Pleasing God is the highest necessity. Since therefore philosophy cannot climb to the things that are of faith, there should be another doctrine that procedes from the principles of faith.
Item, effectus non proportionatus causae, imperfecte ducit in cognitionem suae causae. Talis autem effectus est omnis creatura respectu creatoris, a quo in infinitum distat. Ergo imperfecte ducit in ipsius cognitionem. Cum igitur philosophia non procedat nisi per rationes sumptas ex creaturis, insufficiens est ad Dei cognitionem faciendam. Ergo oportet aliquam aliam doctrinam esse altiorem, quae per revelationem procedat, quae suppleat. Again, an effect that is non proportionate to its cause leads us only imperfectly to a knowledge of its cause. Every creature with respect to the Creator, from whom the creature is infinitely distant, is such an effect. Since philosophy does not move forward except by reasonings derived from creatures, philosophy is insufficient for making knowledge of God. Therefore there should be some other higher doctrine that takes revelation as its starting point to supplement philosophy.
Ad huius evidentiam sciendum est, quod omnes qui recte senserunt posuerunt finem humanae vitae Dei contemplationem. Contemplatio autem Dei est dupliciter. Una per creaturas, quae imperfecta est, ratione iam dicta, in quae contemplatione philosophus, felicitatem contemplativam posuit, quae tamen est felicitas viae; et ad hanc ordinatur tota cognitio philosophica, quae ex rationibus creaturarum procedit. Est alia Dei contemplatio, qua videtur immediate per suam essentiam; et haec perfecta est, quae erit in patria et est homini possibilis secundum fidei suppositionem. Unde oportet ut ea quae sunt ad finem proportionentur fini, quatenus homo manuducatur ad illam contemplationem in statu viae per cognitionem non a creaturis sumptam, sed immediate ex divino lumine inspiratam; et haec est doctrina theologiae. Ex hoc possumus habere duas conclusiones. Una est, quod ista scientia imperat omnibus aliis scientiis tamquam principalis: alia est, quod ipsa utitur in obsequium sui omnibus aliis scientiis quasi vassallis, sicut patet in omnibus artibus ordinatis, quarum finis unius est sub fine alterius, sicut finis pigmentariae artis, qui est confectio medicinarum, ordinatur ad finem medicinae, qui est sanitas: unde medicus imperat pigmentario et utitur pigmentis ab ipso factis, ad suum finem. Ita, cum finis totius philosophiae sit infra finem theologiae, et ordinatus ad ipsum, theologia debet omnibus aliis scientiis imperare et uti his quae in eis traduntur. As evidence of this, it should be known that all who have had right sense have set forth the contemplation of God as the end of human life. The contemplation of God is of two kinds. One contemplation is by way of creatures, and this is imperfect for the reason already mentioned, and the philosopher thought that contemplative happiness was in this contemplation. But this is the happiness of the way (of the wayfarer in this life). All philosophical knowing is ordered to this contemplative happiness, which procedes from reasonings based on creatures. There is another contemplation of God whereby God appears directly by his essence; and this contemplation is perfect, because it will be in the fatherland (heaven) and is possible to man according to the supposition of faith. Hence those things that are for the sake of a certain end should be proportioned to that end, insofar as man is led by the hand to this contemplation while still in the state of the way (in this earthly life of the wayfarer) by a knowledge that is not derived from creatures but inspired directly by the divine light. This is the doctrine of theology. From this we can draw two conclusions. One conclusion is that this science rules all the other sciences as the principle science: another conclusion is that this science uses all the other sciences as vassals subordinate to itself. This is plainly seen in other arts that are ordered, where the end of one art is under the end of another, as the end of the art of pigment-making, which is the confection of medicines, (we would probably call this pharmacology), is ordered to the end of medicine, which is health. Hence the physician commands the maker of pigments and uses for this own end the pigments that the other makes. Thus, since the end of all philosophy lies below the end of theology and is ordered to that end, theology should command all the other sciences and use the things that are passed on in them.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis philosophia determinet de existentibus et secundum rationes a creaturis sumptas, oportet tamen esse aliam quae existentia consideret secundum rationes ex inspiratione divini luminis acceptas. In response to the first objection it should be said that, although philosophy determines about things that exist and according to reasonings that are derived from creatures, there should still be another doctrine that considers existing things according to reasonings that are received from the inspiration of the divine light.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum: quia philosophia sufficit ad perfectionem intellectus secundum cognitionem naturalem, et affectus secundum virtutem acquisitam: et ideo oportet esse aliam scientiam per quam intellectus perficiatur quantum ad cognitionem infusam, et affectus quantum ad dilectionem gratuitam. And by this the solution to the second objection is clear: because philosophy is sufficient for the perfection of our understanding according to our natural knowledge, and it is sufficient for the perfection of our character according to acquired virtue: and therefore there should be another science by which our understanding is perfected with respect to infused knowledge, and our character is perfected with respect to a love that is produced by grace.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in his quae acquirunt aequalem bonitatem pro fine, tenet propositio inducta, scilicet, nobilius est eo quod per se consequi non potest. Sed illud quod acquirit bonitatem perfectam pluribus auxiliis et motibus, est nobilius eo quod imperfectam bonitatem acquirit paucioribus, vel per ipsum, sicut dicit philosophus; et hoc modo se habet homo respectu aliarum creaturarum, qui factus est ad ipsius divinae gloriae participationem. In response to the third objection, that with respect to things that acquire equal goodness for the sake of an end, the induced proposition holds true, namely, that it is nobler that that which it cannot achieve by itself. But that which acquires perfect goodness with many helpers and motions, is nobler than that which acquires only imperfect goodness by fewer helpers or motions, or by itself, as the philosopher says; and this is how man is with respect to other creatures, and man was made for a participation in the divine glory itself.

In I Sententiarum - Question 1, Article 2.

Utrum tantum una doctrina debeat esse praeter physicas Whether aside from the physical doctrines there should be only one other doctrine
Circa secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non una tantum doctrina debeat esse praeter physicas doctrinas, sed plures. De omnibus enim de quibus instruitur homo per rationes creaturarum, potest instrui per rationes divinas. Sed scientiae procedentes per rationes creaturarum sunt plures, differentes genere et specie, sicut moralis, naturalis etc... Ergo scientiae procedentes per rationes divinas debent plures esse. So we procede to the second article. It seems that aside from the physical doctrines there should not be only one doctrine, but several. Man can be instructed by divine reasons about all the things about which he is instructed by reasons derived from creatures. But there are many sciences that procede by way of reasons derived from creatures. These sciences differ in genus and species, such as moral science, natural science etc. Therefore there should be several sciences that procede by divine reasons.
Item, una scientia est unius generis subiecti, sicut dicit philosophus. Sed Deus et creatura, de quibus in divina doctrina tractatur, non reducuntur in unum genus, neque univoce neque analogice. Ergo divina scientia non est una. Probatio mediae. Quaecumque conveniunt in uno genere univoce vel analogice, participant aliquid idem, vel secundum prius et posterius, sicut substantia et accidens rationem entis, vel aequaliter, sicut equus et bos rationem animalis. Sed Deus et creatura non participant aliquid idem, quia illud esset simplicius et prius utroque. Ergo nullo modo reducuntur in idem genus. Again, one genus of subject belongs to one science, as the philosopher says. But God and creature, which are treated in divine doctrine, are not reduced to one genus, neither univocally or in an analogical sense. Therefore divine science is not one. The proof of the middle term. Whatever things agree or coincide in one genus, whether unically or in an analogical sense, participate something that is the same. They participate in the same thing either as one is primary and the other secondary or dependent, as substance and accidents share the meaning of being, or equally, as the horse and the cow both share the meaning of animal. But God and creature do not share some one thing that is the same, because God is simpler and more primary than the creature. Therefore in no way can they be reduced to the same genus.
Item, ea quae sunt ab opere nostro, sicut opera virtutum et quae sunt ab opere naturae, non reducuntur ad eamdem scientiam; sed unum pertinet ad moralem, alterum ad naturalem. Sed divina scientia determinat de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, tractando de virtutibus et praeceptis: tractat etiam de his quae non sunt ab opere nostro, sicut de angelis et aliis creaturis. Ergo videtur quod non sit una scientia. Again, things that are the result of our work, such the works of the virtues, and those things that result from the work of nature, cannot be brought under the same science; but one pertains to moral science, the other to natural science. But divine science studies the things that result from our action, discussing the virtues and precepts: it also discusses things that are not the result of our work, such as angels and other creatures. Therefore it seems that it is not one science.
Contra, quaecumque conveniunt in ratione una possunt ad unam scientiam pertinere: unde etiam omnia, inquantum conveniunt in ratione entis, pertinent ad metaphysicam. Sed divina scientia determinat de rebus per rationem divinam quae omnia complectitur: omnia enim et ab ipso ad ad ipsum sunt. Ergo ipsa una existens potest de diversis esse. On the contrary, whatever things coincide in one meaning can belong to one science: hence also all things, insofar as they coincide in the meaning of being, belong to metaphysics. But divine science studies things by divine reason which comprises all things: for all things are from Him and directed to Him. Therefore divine science, while being one science, can be about diverse things.
Praeterea, quae sunt diversarum scientiarum, distinctim et in diversis libris determinantur. Sed in sacra scriptura permixtim in eodem libro quandoque determinatur de moribus, quandoque de creatore, quandoque de creaturis, sicut patet fere in omnibus libris. Ergo ex hoc non diversificatur scientia. Furthermore, things that belong to diverse sciences are studied distinctly and in different books. But in Sacred Scripture, in the same book, sometimes one reads about moral qualities, sometime about the Creator, sometime about creatures, as we see in almost all the books (of Sacred Scripture). Therefore, the science is not diversified on this account.
Respondeo. Ad hoc notandum est, quod aliqua cognitio quanto altior est, tanto est magis unica et ad plura se extendit: unde intellectus Dei, qui est altissimus, per lumen quod est ipse Deus, omnium rerum cognitionem habet distincte. Ita et cum ista scientia sit altissima et per ipsum lumen inspirationis divinae efficaciam habens, ipsa unica manens, non multiplicata, diversarum rerum considerationem habet, non tantum in communi, sicut metaphysica, quae considerat omnia inquantum sunt entia, non descendens ad propriam cognitionem moralium, vel naturalium, ratio enim entis, cum sit diversificata in diversis, non est sufficiens ad specialem rerum cognitionem; ad quarum manifestationem divinum lumen in se unum manens, secundum beatum Dionysium in principio Caelestis Hierarchiae, efficaciam habet. I answer. To this, it should be noted that one knowledge is higher to the degree that it is more united and extends to more things: hence God's understanding, which (who) is most high, by the light which is God himself, has a knowledge of all things distinctly. Thus while this science is the highest and has efficacy by the very light of divine inspiration, it remains one, not becoming many, while it considers diverse things. It considers diverse thing not only in common, as does metaphysics which considers all things insofar as they are beings without descending to to the proper knowledge of moral matters or natural things. The meaning of being, since it is diversified in diverse things, is not sufficient for a special cognition of things. According to blessed Dionysius in the beginning of his work about the Celestial Hierarchy, the divine light has the efficacy to manifest diverse things while it remains one in itself.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod divinum lumen, ex cuius certitudine procedit haec scientia, est efficax ad manifestationem plurium quae in diversis scientiis in philosophia traduntur, ex eorum rationibus in eorum cognitionem procedentibus; et ideo non oportet scientiam istam multiplicari. To the first objection, it should be said that the divine light, from whose certainty this science procedes, is able effectively to manifest the several things that are taught in diverse sciences in philosophy. Those sciences procede from the meanings of things to their knowledge. And thus this science should not be regarded as being several sciences.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse dupliciter. Aut ex eo quod aliquae partipant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit, et talis est analogia creaturae ad creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit: unde nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur. To the second objection, it should be said that the Creature and the creature are reduced to one, non by community of univocation but by community of analogy. Such a community can exist in two senses. Either because some things share some one thing according to one being primary and the other being secondary, as potency and act both share the meaning of being, and likewise substance and accident; or because one things receives existence and meaning from the other, and such is the analogy of creature to the Creator: the creature does not have existence except to the extent that it has come down from the first being; hence the creature is not called a being except insofar as it imiated the first being; and it is the same concerning wisdom and all the other things that are said of the creature.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ea quae sunt ab opere nostro et ea quae sunt ab opere naturae, considerata secundum proprias rationes, non cadunt in eamdem doctrinam. Una tamen scientia utrumquae potest considerare, quae per lumen divinum certitudinem habet, quod est efficax ad cognitionem utriusquae. Potest tamen aliter dici, quod virtus quam theologus considerat, non est ab opere nostro: immo eam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, secundum Augustinum. To the third objection, it should be said that the things that result from our action and those that result from the action of nature, if considered each according to their proper meanings, do not fall under the same doctrine. However, one science can consider both, which science possesses certainty by the divine light, which is capable of the knowledge of both. It can be said in another way, that the virtue that the theologian considers is not the result of our action: rather God works this virtue inside of us and without our assistance, according to Augustine.

In I Sententiarum - Question 1, Article 3

Utrum sit practica vel speculativa Whether this doctrine is practical or speculative
Circa tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ista doctrina sit practica. Finis enim practicae est opus, secundum philosophum. Sed ista doctrina, quae fidei est, principaliter est ad bene operandum; unde Jacob. 2, 26: Fides sine operibus mortua est, et Psalm. 110, 10: Intellectus bonus omnibus facientibus eum. Ergo videtur quod sit practica. We procede as follows to the third article. This doctrine seems to be practical. The end of practical doctrine is the work, according to the philosopher. But this doctrine, which is of the faith, is principally for the sake of acting well; hence James 2, 26: Faith without works is dead, and Psalm 110, 10: Good understanding for all those who live by the fear of the Lord. Therefore it seems that this doctrine is practical.
Contra, dicit philosophus, quod nobilissima scientiarum est sui gratia. Practicae autem non sunt sui gratia, immo propter opus. Ergo, cum ista nobilissima sit scientiarum, non erit practica. To the contrary, the philosopher says that the most noble of sciences exists for the sake of itself. The practical sciences do not exist for their own sakes, but rather for the sake of a work. Therefore, since this is the noblest of the sciences, it will not be practical.
Praeterea, practica scientia determinat tantum ea quae sunt ab opere nostro. Haec autem doctrina considerat angelos et alias creaturas, quae non sunt ab opere nostro. Ergo non est practica, sed speculativa. Furthermore, a practical science studies only those things that are the result of our action. This doctrine considers angels and other creatures that are not the result of our work. Therefore it is not practical but speculative.
Ulterius quaeritur, utrum sit scientia; et videtur quod non. Nulla enim scientia est de particularibus, secundum philosophum. Sed in sacra scriptura gesta traduntur particularium hominum, sicut Abraham, Isaac etc.. Ergo non est scientia. Further we ask, whether it is a science; and it would seem not. No science is about particular things, according to the philosohper. But in Sacred Scripture we find the historical deeds of particular men, such as Abraham, Isaac etc.. Therefore it is not a science.
Praeterea, omnis scientia procedit ex principiis per se notis, quae cuilibet sunt manifesta. Haec autem scientia procedit ex credibilibus, quae non ab omnibus conceduntur. Ergo non est scientia. Furthermore, every science procedes from principles that are known by themselves, which are manifest to anyone. This science takes as its starting point matters of belief that are not conceded by all. Therefore it is not a science.
Praeterea, in omni scientia acquiritur aliquis habitus per rationes inductas. Sed in hac doctrina non acquiritur aliquis habitus: quia fides, cui total doctrina haec innititur, non est habitus acquisitus, sed infusus. Ergo non est scientia. Furthermore, in every science some habit is acquired by the reasons set forth. But in this doctrine no habit is acquired: because faith, upon which this entire doctrine relies, is not an acquired habit, but an infused habit. Therefore it is not a science.
Contra, secundum Augustinum, theologia est scientia de rebus quae ad salutem hominis pertinent. Ergo est scientia. On the contrary, according to Augustine, theology is a science about things that pertain to man's salvation. Therefore it is a science.
Ulterius quaeritur, utrum sit sapientia; et videtur quod non. Quia, sicut dicit philosophus, sapiens debet esse certissimus causarum. Sed in ista doctrina non est aliquis certissimus; quia fides, cui haec doctrina innititur, est infra scientiam et supra opinionem. Ergo non est sapientia. Further. it is asked whether this doctrine is wisdom; and it seems not. Because, as the philosopher says, a wise person should be the one who is the most certain about causes. But in this doctrine there is no one who is most certain; because faith, upon which this doctrine relies, is below science and above opinion. Therefore it is not wisdom.
Contra, 1 Corinth. 2, 6: Sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos. Cum ergo hanc doctrinam ipse docuerit et de ipsa loquatur, videtur quod ipsa sit sapientia. On the contrary, 1 Corinth. 2, 6: We speak wisdom among those who are perfect. Since he teaches this doctrine and speaks of it, it seems that this doctrine is wisdom.
Respondeo dicendum, quod ista scientia, quamvis sit una, tamen perfecta est et sufficiens ad omnem humanam perfectionem, propter efficaciam divini luminis, ut ex praedictis patet. Unde perficit hominem et in operatione recta et quantum ad contemplationem veritatis: unde quantum ad quid practica est et etiam speculativa. Sed, quia scientia omnis principaliter pensanda est ex fine, finis autem ultimus istius doctrinae est contemplatio primae veritatis in patria, ideo principaliter speculativa est. I answer, it should be said that this science, although it is one, is still perfect and sufficient for all human perfection, on account of the effective power of the divine light, as it is clear from what has been said. Hence it perfects man both in right operation and with respect to the contemplation of the truth: hence in some sense it is practical and also speculative. But, since every science is principally dependent upon the end, and the ultimate end of this dotrine is the contemplation of the first truth in the fatherland (heaven), therefore it is principally a speculative science.
Et, cum habitus speculativi sint tres, secundum philosophum, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus; dicimus quod est sapientia, eo quod altissimas causas considerat et est sicut caput et principalis et ordinatrix omnium scientiarum: et est etiam magis dicenda sapientia quam metaphysica, quia causas altissimas considerat per modum ipsarum causarum, quia per inspirationem a Deo immediate acceptam; metaphysica autem considerat causes altissimas per rationes ex creaturis assumptas. Unde ista doctrina magis etiam divina dicenda est quam metaphysica: quia est divina quantum ad subiectum et quantum ad modum accipiendi; metaphysica autem quantum ad subiectum tantum. Sed sapientia, ut dicit philosophus, considerat conclusiones et principia; et ideo sapientia est scientia et intellectus; cum scientia sit de conclusionibus et intellectus de principiis. And, as there are three speculative habits, according to the philosopher, namely wisdom, science, and understanding, we say that this doctrine is wisdom, since it considers the highest causes and is like the head and principal and orderer of all the sciences. It is to be called wisdom even more than metaphysics, because this doctrine considers the highest causes by way of the causes themselves, because it operates by an inspiration that is received directly from God. Metaphysics studies the highest causes by reasons that are derived from creatures. Hence, this doctrine is still more to be called divine than is metaphysics, since this doctrine is divine with respect to its subject and with respect to the way it is recieved; metaphysics is divine only with respect to its subject. But wisdom, as the philosopher says, considers conclusions and principles; and therefore wisdom is science and understanding; while science is about conclusions, and understanding is about principles.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod opus non est ultimum intentum in hac scientia, immo potius contemplatio primae veritatis in hac patria, ad quam depurati ex bonis operibus pervenimus, sicut dicitur Matth. 5, 8: Beati mundo corde; et ideo principalius est speculativa quam practica. To the first objection, it should be said that the ultimate intent in this science is not a work, but rather it is the contemplation of the first truth in this fatherland, to which we come purified by good works, as it says in Matthew 5, 8: Blessed the pure of heart, and therefore this science is more principally speculative than practical.
Alia duo concedimus We concede the other two objections.
Ad id quod ulterius quaeritur, dicendum, quod ista doctrina scientia est. As for what is further asked, it is to be said that this doctrine is a science.
Et quod objicitur, quod est de particularibus, dicendum, quod non est de particularibus inquantum particularia sunt, sed inquantum sunt exempla operandorum: et hoc usitatur etiam in scientia morali; quia operationes particularium circa particularia sunt; unde per exempla particularia, ea quae ad mores pertinent, melius manifestantur. And as for what is raised in objection, that this science concerns itself with particulars, it is to be said that it is not concerned with particulars insofar as they are particulars, but insofar as they are examples of how actions should be done: and this is also used in moral science; because the operations of particulars are concerned with particulars; hence things pertaining to morals are shown more clearly by way of particular examples.

(the following text, up to the next horizontal line, is found in the Mandonnet version of 1929, but ommitted in other versions)
vel dicendum quod in scientia duo est considerare, scilicet certitudinem, quia non quaelibet cognitio, sed certitudinalis tantum dicitur scientia; item quod ipsa est terminus disciplinae; omnia enim quae sunt in scientia ordinantur ad scire. Ex his autem duobos habet scientia duo. Ex primo habet quod est ex necesariis: ex contingentibus enim non potest causari certitudo; ex secundo quod est ex aliquibus principiis; sed hoc est diversimode in diversis, quia superiores scientiae sunt ex principiis per se notis, sicut geometria, et huiusmodi habentia principia per se nota, ut: si ab aequalibus aequalia deruas, etc. or it is to be said that two things are to be considered in science, namely, certainty, because not any kind of knowing, but only that marked by certainty is called sceince; again, that science is the end point of learning; for all the things that are in science are ordered to knowing. From these two things science has two things. From the first, science possesses that which is from necessary things; for certainty cannot be caused by contingent things; from the second thing that which is from certain principles; but this exists variously in various things, because the higher sciences are from principles that are known by themselves, such as geometry, and such that have principles known by themselves, such as: if from equal things you subtract equal things, etc..
Inferiores autem scientiae, quae superioribus subalternantur, non sunt ex principiis per se notis, sed supponunt conclusiones probatas in superioribus scientiis, et eis utuntur pro principiis quae in veritate non sunt principia per se nota, sed in superioribus scientiis per principia per se nota probantur, sicut perspectiva quae est de linea visuali, et subalternatur geometriae a qua etiam supponit quae probantur de linea, inquantum linea, et per illa tanquam per principia probat conclusiones quae sunt de linea, inquantum visualis. Potest autem scientia aliqua esse superior alia dupliciter: vel ratione subiecti, ut geometria quae est de magnitudine, superior est ad perspectivam quae est de magnitudine visuali; vel ratione modi cognoscendi, et sic theologia est inferior scientia quae in Deo est. Nos enim imperfecte cognoscimus id quod ipse perfectissime cognoscit, et sicut scientia subalternata a superiori supponit aliqua, et per illa tanquam per principia procedit; sic theologia articulos fidei quae infallibiliter sunt probati in scientia Dei supponit, et eis credit, et per istud procedit ad probandum ulterius illa quae ex articulis sequuntur. Est ergo theologia scientia quasi subalternata divinae scientiae a qua accepit principia sua. The lower sciences, however, which are subalternate to the higher ones, are not based on principles that are known by themselves, but they suppose conclusions that are proven in the higher sciences, and they use these as principles, which in truth are not principles that are known by themselves, but are proven in the higher sciences by principles that are known by themselves, as perspective concerns the line of vision, and it is subalternate to geometry from which it also supposes those the things that are proven about the line insofar as it is a line, and by these as by principles it proves the conclusions that are abut the line insofar as it is visual. A science can be superior to another science in two ways: either by reason of the subject, as geometry which concerns size is higher than perspective which concerns visual size; or by reason of the mode of knowing, and so theology is inferior to the science which is in God. For we know imperfectly that which he knows most perfectly, and as a science subalternate to a higher science supposes certain things, and it procedes by these things as by principles, so theology supposes the articles of faith which are infallibly proven in God's science, it is believes these articles, and by this it procedes to prove further the things that follow from the articles. Therefore theology is a science that is, as it were, subalternate to the divine science from which it recieves its principles.

Ad aliud dicendum, quod ista doctrina habet pro principiis primis articulos fidei, qui per lumen fidei infusum per se noti sunt habenti fidem, sicut et principia naturaliter nobis insita per lumen intellectus agentis. Nec est mirum, si infidelibus nota non sunt, qui lumen fidei non habent: quia nec etiam principia naturaliter insita nota essent sine lumine intellectus agentis. Et ex istis principiis, non respuens communia principia, procedit ista scientia; nec habet viam ad ea probanda, sed solum ad defendendum a contradicentibus, sicut nec aliquis artifex potest probare sua principia. To another objection, it is to be said that this doctrine has the articles of faith for its first principles. The articles of faith are known through themselves by the infused light of faith to those who have faith, just as the priniples that are naturally placed within us by the light of the agent intellect. Nor should we be surprised, if they are not known to these who do not have faith, those who do not have the light of faith. Because neither would those principles that are naturally placed in us be known if not for the light of the agent intellect. While not rejecting the common principles, this science procedes from those principles. This science does not have a method to prove the principles, but only to defend them from those who contradict them, just as an artisam cannot defend his principles.
Ad aliud dicendum, quod, sicut habitus principiorum primorum non acquiritur per alias scientias, sed habetur a natura; sed habitus conclusionum a primis principiis deductarum: ita etiam in hac doctrina non acquiritur habitus fidei, qui est quasi habitus principiorum; sed acquiritur habitus eorum quae ex eis deducuntur et quae ad eorum defensionem valent. To another objection it should be said, that the habit of first principles is not acquired by other sciences, but it is possessed by nature; but the habit of conclusions deduced from first principles (is acquired through other sciences): thus also the habit of faith is not acquired in this doctrine. The habit of faith is comparable to the habit of principles. But the one acquires (through this doctrine - theology) the habit of the things that are deduced from the principles of faith, and the things that are effective in the defense of the principles of faith.
Aliud concedimusWe concede another objection
Ad id quod ulterius quaeritur, an sit sapientia, dicendum, quod propriissime sapientia est, sicut dictum est. It is asked in another objection, whether this doctrine is wisdom, and it is to be said, that it is wisdom in the most proper sense, as was said.
Et quod obiicitur, quod non est certissimus aliquis in ista doctrina, dicimus, quod falsum est: magis enim fidelis et firmius assentit his quae sunt fidei quam etiam primis principiis rationis. Et quod dicitur, quod fides est infra scientiam, non loquitur de fide infusa, sed de fide acquisita, quae est opinio fortificata rationibus. Habitus autem istorum principiorum, scilicet articulorum, dicitur fides et non intellectus, quia ista principia supra rationem sunt, et ideo humana ratio ipsa perfecte capere non valet; et sic fit quaedam defectiva cognitio, non ex defectu certitudinis cognitorum, sed ex defectu cognoscentis. Sed tamen ratio manuducta per fidem excrescit in hoc ut ipsa credibilia plenius comprehendat, et tunc ipsa quodammodo intelligit: unde dicitur Isa. 7, 9, secundum aliam litteram: Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. And the objection that someone is not most certain in this doctrine, we say that this is false: one is more faithful and assents more firmly to the things that are of faith that even to the first principles of reason. And that which is said, that faith is below science, is not concerned with infused faith, but with acquired faith, which is opinion fortified by reasonable arguments. The habit of these principles, namely articles, is called faith and not understanding, because these principles are above reason, and therefore the human reason cannot grasp them perfectly; and so there comes about a certain defective cognition, not because of any shortcoming in certaintly regarding the things known, but from a shortcoming in the one who knows. But yet the reason, hand-led by faith, grows in this sense, that it more fully grasps the things that are matters of belief, and in a certain sense then understands them: hence it is said in Isaiah 7, 9, according to one translation: Unless you believe, you will not understand.

In I Sententiarum - Question 1, Article 4.

Utrum Deus sit subiectum istius scientiaeWhether God is the subject of this science
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit subiectum istius scientiae. Omnis enim scientia debet intitulari et denominari a suo subiecto. Sed ista scientia dicitur theologia, quasi sermo de Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus sit subiectum eius. Contra, Boetius dicit quod simplex forma subiectum esse non potest. Sed Deus est huiusmodi. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. We procede to the fourth article. It seems that God is the subject of this science. Every science should be titled and named from its subject. But this science is called theology, as if, talk about God. Therefore it seems that God is the subject of theology. On the contrary, Boethius said a simple form cannot be a subject. But God is a simple form. Therefore he cannot be the subject (of theology).
Item, videtur, secundum Hugonem de Sancto Victore, quod opera restaurationis sint subiectum: sic enim dicit, quod opera primae conditionis sunt materiae aliarum scientiarum, opera autem restaurationis sunt materia theologiae. Ergo etc... Contra, quidquid determinatur in scientia debet contineri sub subiecto ipsius. Sed in theologia determinatur de operibus creationis, ut patet Genes. 1. Ergo videtur quod opera restaurationis non sint subiectum. Again, it seems, according to Hugh of Saint Victor, that the works of restoration are the subject (of theology); he says that the works of the first condition are the materials of the other sciences, but the works of restoration are the material of theology. Therefore, etc... On the contrary, whatever is determined in a science should be contained under its subject. But in theology one determines concerning the works of creation, as it is clear in Genesis 1. Therefore it seems that works of restoration are not the subject.
Item, videtur quod res et signa sint subiectum: illud enim est subiectum in scientia circa quod tota scientiae intentio versatur. Sed tota intentio theologiae versatur circa res et signa, ut dicit magister Sententiarum. Ergo res et signa sunt subiectum. Contra, per rationes subiecti debet scientia differre ab aliis scientiis, cum quaelibet scientia habeat proprium subiectum. Sed de rebus et signis considerant etiam aliae scientiae. Ergo non sunt proprium subiectum huius scientiae. Again, it seems that things and signs are the subject of this science: That about which the entire intention of a science turns is the subject in a science. But the entire intention of theology turns about things and signs, as the master of the Sentences says. Therefore things and signs are the subject of theology. On the contrary, by the reasons of the subject one science should differ from other sciences, since each and every sceince has its own proper subject. But other sciences also consider things and signs. Therefore they are not the proper subject of this science.
Respondeo, quod subiectum habet ad scientiam ad minus tres comparationes. Prima est, quod quaecumque sunt in scientia debent contineri sub subiecto. Unde considerantes hanc conditionem, posuerunt res et signa esse subiectum huius scientiae; quidam autem totum Christum, idest caput et membra; eo quod quidquid in hac scientia traditur, ad hoc reduci videtur. Secunda comparatio est, quod subiecti cognitio principaliter attenditur in scientia. Unde, quia ista scientia principaliter est ad cognitionem Dei, posuerunt Deum esse subjectum eius. Tertia comparatio est, quod per subjectum distinguitur scientia ab omnibus aliis; quia secantur scientiae quemadmodum et res, ut dicitur in 3 De Anima; et secundum hanc considerationem, posuerunt quidam, credibile esse subiectum huius scientiae. Haec enim scientia in hoc ab omnibus aliis differt, quia per inspirationem fidei procedit. Quidam autem opera restaurationis, eo quod tota scientia ista ad consequendum restaurationis effectum ordinatur. Si autem volumus invenire subiectum quod haec omnia comprehendat, possumus dicere quod ens divinum cognoscibile per inspirationem est subiectum huius scientiae. Omnia enim quae in hac scientia considerantur, sunt aut Deus, aut ea quae ex Deo et ad Deum sunt, inquantum huiusmodi: sicut etiam medicus considerat signa et causas et multa huiusmodi, inquantum sunt sana, idest ad sanitatem aliquo modo relata. Unde quanto aliquid magis accedit ad veram rationem divinitatis, principalius consideratur in hac scientia. I answer, that the subject (of a science) has at least three conditions of comparison to the science. The first is that whatever things are in the science should be contained under the subject. Hence those who consider this condition state that things and signs are the subject of this science; some state that the subject is Christ, that is, the head and the members; because whatever is passed on in this science seems to be reduced to this. The second comparison is that in a science one is principally interested in the cognition of the subject. Hence, because this science is principle for the knowledge of God, they state that God is the subject of this science. The third comparison is that one science is distinguished from all others by its subject; because, as it is said in 3 On the Soul, the sciences are divided in the same way as things; and according to this consideration, some state that the subject of this science is that which is a matter of belief. For this science differs from all others, because it procedes by the inspiration of faith. Some think that the subject of this science are the works of restoration, because this entire science is ordered to achieve the effect of restoration. However, if we wish to find the subject that comprises all this things, we can say that Divine Being as knowable by inspiration is the subect of this science. All the things that are considered in this science are either God, or the things that are from God and to God as such; just as a doctor considers signs and causas and many things of this sort insofar as they are healthy, that is, in someway related to health. Hence the more closer somethin comes to true knowledge of divinity, the more principally is it considered in this science.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus non est subiectum, nisi sicut principaliter intentum, et sub cius ratione omnia quae sunt in scientia, considerantur. Quod autem obiicitur in contrarium, quod forma simplex non potest esse subiectum, dicimus, quod verum est accidentis: nihilominus tamen potest esse subiectum praedicati in propositione; et omne tale potest esse subiectum in scientia, dummodo illud praedicatum de eo probari possit. To the first objection, it should be said that God is not the subject, except as that which is principally intended, and under whose meaning one considers all things that are within the science. What is objected to the contrary, that a simple form cnanot be the subject, we say that the true is of an accident: nevertheless the true can be the subject of a predicate in a proposition; and every such things can be the subject in a science, so long as the predicate can be proved of it.
Ad aliud dicendum, quod opera restaurationis non sunt proprie subiectum huius scientiae, nisi inquantum omnia quae in hac scientia dicuntur, ad restaurationem nostram quodammodo ordinantur. To another objection, it is to be said, that the works of restoration are not properly the subject of science, except insofar as all the things that are said in this science are in some way ordered to our restoration.
Ad aliud dicendum, quod res et signa communiter accepta, non sunt subiectum huius scientiae, sed inquantum sunt quaedam divina. To another objection, it is to be said, that commonly accepted things and signs are not as such the subject of this science, but insofar as some are divine.

In I Sententiarum - Question 1, Article 5.

Utrum modus procedendi sit artificialis. Whether the way of proceeding is artificial
Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod modus procedendi non sit artificialis. Nobilissimae enim scientiae debet esse nobilissimus modus. Sed quanto magis modus est artificialis, tanto nobilior est. Ergo, cum haec scientia sit nobilissima, modus ejus debet esse artificialissimus.So we proceed to the fifth article. It seems that the way of proceding is not artificial. The most noble sciences should have the most noble way (procedure). But the more artificial a way (procedure) is, the more noble it is. Therefore, since this science is the nobles, its method should be the most artificial. (translator's note: "artificial" should not be taken to mean "inauthentic", but probably as "skilfull", "a matter of artful skill". Lacking the "artful skill" to come up with an appropriate adjective, the translator leaves it stand!)
Praeterea, modus scientiae debet ipsi scientiae proportionari. Sed ista scientia maxime est una, ut probatum est. Ergo et modus ejus debet esse maxime unicus. Cujus contrarium videtur, cum quandoque comminando, quandoque praecipiendo, quandoque aliis modis procedat. Furthermore, the method of a science should be proportioned to the science itself. But this science is one to the greatest degree, as has been proved. Therefore its method should also be unified to the greatest degree. It seems to be the opposite, since it procedes sometimes by making threats, sometimes by giving precepts, and sometimes by other methods.
Praeterea, scientiarum maxime differentium non debet esse unus modus. Sed poetica, quae minimum continet veritatis, maxime differt ab ista scientia, quae est verissima. Ergo, cum illa procedat per metaphoricas locutiones, modus hujus scientiae non debet esse talis. Therefore, there should not be one method for sciences which are different to the greatest degree. But the poetic (art), which contains the least amount of truth, differs to the greatest degree from this science, which is the most true. Therefore, since it (theology) procedes by metaphorical sayings, the method of this science should not such as it is.
Praeterea, Ambrosius: Tolle argumenta ubi fides quaeritur. Sed in sacra scientia maxime quaeritur fides. Ergo modus ejus nullo modo debet esse argumentativus. Furthermore, Saint Ambrose says: Remove arguments where faith is sought. But in the sacred science faith is sought in the greatest degree. Therefore its method should not in any way be argumentative.
Contra, 1 Pet. 3, 15: Parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea, quae in vobis est, spe. Hoc autem sine argumentis fieri non valet. Ergo debet quandoque argumentis uti. On the contrary, 1 Peter 3, 15: Always (be) prepared to satisfy all who ask you for the reason of the faith that is in you. But this cannot be done without the use of arguments. Therefore we should sometimes use arguments.
Idem habetur ex hoc quod dicitur Tit. 1, 9: ut potens sit exhortari in doctrina sana et eos qui contradicunt, arguere. The same point is made in what we read in Paul's epistle to Titus 1, 9: so that he may be able to exhort in sane doctrine and argue against those who contradict.
Respondeo dicendum, quod modus cujusque scientiae debet inquiri secundum conditiones materiae, ut dicit Boetius, et philosophus. Principia autem hujus scientiae sunt per revelationem accepta; et ideo modus accipiendi ipsa principia debet esse revelativus ex parte infundentis, ut in revelationibus prophetarum, et orativus ex parte recipientis, ut patet in Psalmis. I answer saying, that we should sheek the method of any science according to the conditions of the matter (the subject-matter), as Boethius and the philosopher (Aristotle) say. The principles of this science are accepted by revelation, and so the method for accepting this principles is by revelation on the part of the one who pours it forth into us, as in the revelations of the prophets, and it is by prayer on the part of the one who receives, as it appears in the Psalms.
Sed quia, praeter lumen infusum, oportet quod habitus fidei distinguatur ad determinata credibilia ex doctrina praedicantis, secundum quod dicitur Rom. 10, 14: Quomodo credent ei quem non audierunt? Sicut etiam intellectus principiorum naturaliter insitorum determinatur per sensibilia accepta, veritas autem praedicantis per miracula confirmatur, ut dicitur Marc. ult. 20: Illi autem profecti praedicaverunt ubique, Domino cooperante et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis; oportet etiam quod modus istius scientiae sit narrativus signorum, quae ad confirmationem fidei faciunt: et, quia etiam ista principia non sunt proportionata humanae rationi secundum statum viae, quae ex sensibilibus consuevit accipere, ideo oportet ut ad eorum cognitionem per sensibilium similitudines manuducatur: unde oportet modum istius scientiae esse metaphoricum, sive symbolicum, vel parabolicum. But since, apart from the infused light, the habit of faith should be distinguised to determined matters of faith from the teaching of the preacher, accordign to what we read in Paul's letter to the Romans, 10, 14: How shall they believe him whom they have not heard?, so also the understanding of principles that are naturally within us is determined by the sensible things we receive, but the truth of the preacher is confirmed by miracles, as it says in the Gospel of Mark, last chapter, v. 20: They went forth and preached everywhere, with the help of God who confirmed their words with the following signs: the method of this science must be to narrate the signs that they performed for the confirmation of faith: and, because these principles are not proportioned to the human reason according to the state of the way (the state of the wayfarer - this earthly life), where we usually receive these principles from sensible things, therefore one should be led by hand to the knowledge of these principles by likenesses of sensible things: hence the mode of this science should be metaphorical, that is, symbolic, or parabolic.
Ex istis autem principiis ad tria proceditur in sacra scriptura: scilicet ad destructionem errorum, quod sine argumentis fieri non potest; et ideo oportet modum hujus scientiae esse quandoque argumentativum, tum per auctoritates, tum etiam per rationes et similitudines naturales. Proceditur etiam ad instructionem morum: unde quantum ad hoc modus ejus debet esse praeceptivus, sicut in lege; comminatorius et promissivus, ut in prophetis; et narrativus exemplorum, ut in historialibus. From this principles we make our way to three things in Sacred Scripture: namely - to the destruction of errors, which could not be done without arguments; and therefore the method of this science should sometimes be argumentative, sometimes by resorting to authorities, sometimes also be reasons and natural likenesses. It also procedes to the instruction of moral actions: and with respect to this its method should be of giving precepts, as in the Law; threatening and promising, as in the Prophets: and narrating examples, in the historical passages.
Proceditur tertio ad contemplationem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae scripturae; et ad hoc oportet modum etiam esse argumentativum, quod praecipue servatur in originalibus sanctorum et in isto libro, qui quasi ex ipsis conflatur. Et secundum hoc etiam potest accipi quadrupliciter modus exponendi sacram scripturam: quia secundum quod accipitur ipsa veritas fidei, est sensus historicus: secundum autem quod ex eis proceditur ad instructionem morum, est sensus moralis; secundum autem quod proceditur ad contemplationem veritatis eorum quae sunt viae, est sensus allegoricus; et secundum quod proceditur ad contemplationem veritatis eorum quae sunt patriae, est sensus anagogicus. Ad destructionem autem errorum non proceditur nisi per sensum litteralem, eo quod alii sensus sunt per similitudines accepti et ex similitudinariis locutionibus non potest sumi argumentatio; unde et Dionysius dicit (in Epistola ad Titum, in princip.) quod symbolica theologia non est argumentativa. Third, it proceeds to the contemplation of truth in questions of Sacred Scripture; and to this purpose the method should be that of arguments, which is observed in the original writings of the saints and in this book, which is like a compilation of them. (translator's note: the Sentences of Peter Lombard was a compilation of the sayings of the Church Fathers arranged according to subject matter, widely used at the time.) In this respect, we can accept a fourfold method for expounding upon Sacred Scripture: the historical sense is according as the truth itself of faith is accepted: as it procedes from these to the instruction of moral actions, we have the moral sense; the anagogical sense is as it procedes to the contemplation of the truth about things that are in the fatherland (this refers to heaven - our true fatherland - translator's note). To the destruction of errors the only way to procede is by the literal sense, since all the other senses are by likenesses that we receive and we cannot derive any argumentation from sayings that are based on likenesses; hence Dionysius also says (in Epistola ad Titum, in princip.), that symbolic theology is not argumentative.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod modus artificialis dicitur qui competit materiae; unde modus qui est artificialis in geometria, non est artificialis in ethica: et secundum hoc modus hujus scientiae maxime artificialis est, quia maxime conveniens materiae. In response to the first objection, we say, that a method is called artificial as it is suitable to the subject-matter; hence the method that is artificial in geometry is not artificial in ethics; and accordingly the method of this science is artificial to the greatest degree, because it is most suitable to the subject-matter
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis ista scientia una sit, tamen de multis est et ad multa valet, secundum quae oportet modos ejus multiplicari, ut jam patuit. To the second objection, I say that although this science is one, it still concerns many things and makes points about many things, and with respect to these things it must have many methods, as has already become apparent.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi; unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinibus ratio seducatur: theologia autem est de his quae sunt supra rationem; et ideo modus symbolicus utrique communis est, cum neutra rationi proportionetur. To the third objection, I say that the poetic science concerns things that cannot be grasped by reason because of a shortage of truth; hence the reason must be seduced by certain likenesses; theology, however, is about things that are above our reason; and so the symbolic mode is common to both, since neither is proportioned to our reason.